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A Social Forecast Revisited
In 1971, as young researchers, we produced a forecast of the future of leisure in the United Kingdom [1] . In 2001, the Future Foundation, of which Michael Willmott is now a director, gathered some survey data on leisure activities. Since 2001 was the target year for our forecasts, this gave us an opportunity to see how good our forecasts were, to reassess the mechanism by which our forecasts were made and to test the assumptions that underpin many of today's forecasting methods. It also provides some interesting pointers to the nature of social and economic change in Britain over the course of the last 30 years and the role of leisure within that. But, before considering these questions, we need to explain the forecasts and how we came to make them.
We were working then at the Institute of Community Studies in Bethnal Green, where Michael Young and Peter Willmott were analysing the results of their London Region Survey, which were to form the basis of their book The Symmetrical Family [2] . The telecommunications division of the Post Office (later British Telecom, later still BT) commissioned the Institute to carry out a forecast of leisure, one of a set of related forecasts of aspects of life in the U.K. in 2001. The London Region Survey had contained questions about a range of leisure activities, and the results were to form the basis for the forecast. (The report itself was not published but part of it was used as the basis for Appendix 5 of The Symmetrical Family.)
We claim no originality for the basic forecasting method we used. Variations on it were well known at the time and are in widespread use today. The report on the forecast [3] describes it as follows:
The central assumption is that The method that we used to assess the relative importance of these variables for each leisure activity was fairly homespun. For each activity, we simply looked at a large number of tables of results from the London Region Survey -showing, for example, how swimming was related to age and income, age and car-ownership and so on -and made our own estimates of the importance of each of the five variables in determining participation in that activity [4] . (Nowadays, of course, there are multivariate statistical techniques that can analyse this quite simply and more accurately. Although such methods were available in the early 1970s, for some reason we did not use them; perhaps we did not have the necessary computing facilities, or perhaps we just did not know about them then.)
The forecasts of the five forecasting variables themselves -the breakdown of the adult population of the U.K. in 2001 by age, income, social class and so on -were obviously fundamental. We used official forecasts where these existed, or the other forecasts commissioned by the Post Office, or we made our own extrapolations from published figures. The forecasts we used were as follows, with, where available, data from the present day for comparison [5] . The figures are percentages of the population of the U.K. aged 18 or over, except those for car-ownership and income, which are percentages of households. The forecast we used for age overestimated the numbers of young people and underestimated the numbers of elderly, by a few percent in each case. On income, the Post Office forecast of the overall increase in average incomes was about right (a 2.2 fold increase in real terms between 1971 and 2001). But, our estimates of the current distribution of incomes shows that the assumptions on how that overall rise in income would be shared across the population were not correct [6] . While the projections foresaw a rebalancing towards middle-income groups, in fact the proportion of households in higher income groups has grown faster and those in the poorest fallen less than had been expected. Income polarisation had been decreasing since the war, but from the middle of the 1970s -just a few years after our forecasts were done -and for the next twenty years, the gap between rich and poor increased. On car ownership, although we did a bit better, we encountered the same (and presumably related) problem as with income in that we did not expect that inequality in British society would actually increase.
The social class forecasts are more difficult to assess because the definitions have changed over time. In fact official statistics no longer use the five-class system used for the forecasts. For most of the last thirty years the SEG (Socio-Economic Group) system has been preferred, and that too has now been superseded by the NS-SEC (National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification). The following These figures suggest that the forecast was broadly right in predicting an increase at the upper end and a decrease at the lower, but it looks as though the very high growth predicted for class 1 was a bit wayward.
These considerations highlight an obvious point about forecasting -it can only be as good as the assumptions that underlie any model. In Britain, government forecasters have consistently under-estimated the ageing of the population [8] while, as we have pointed out, changes in income distribution have proved equally difficult to predict.
The leisure data for 1971 came from the responses of about 2000 adults in the London Region to the question "Have you engaged in this activity at least once in the last twelve months?" The alternative was "twelve times or more". Our reason for using the "once" figures was simply that the number of participants in many leisure activities is very small -perhaps only two or three percent of the adult population; adopting the "twelve times" criterion would have drastically reduced the numbers in our tables and thus ruled out many activities from the study. So far as we could tell from the more popular activities, the "twelve times" people did not differ from the "once" people in social profile, only in numbers. The data for 2001 came from a survey [9] of about 1000 adults in the U.K., using the same question and list of activities as in 1971.
Using London Region data gave us a problem in 1971 since we were required to produce forecasts for the whole of the country, so we had to make estimates of leisure figures for the U.K. based on the Greater London results (see Appendix). Even though the Greater London Region contains around a half of the population of the U.K., leisure activities have strong regional variation, so this adds another area of uncertainty to the forecasting exercise and, in retrospect, is probably one explanation for some of the differences between forecasts and outcome that we discuss below.
So, to return to our original question, how well did we do with our forecasts? The original report summarised the overall forecast as follows: We were broadly right about that. Of the 48 activities that were included in both surveys, 34 of them (71%) had risen in popularity, and, while several of the rising ones had risen strikingly, those that had gone down, with a couple of exceptions, had not gone down by much.
We were also right about the general level of increase. For each of the 48 activities in 1971 we have a percentage of people taking part, so we can calculate the average of these percentages. This is not a very meaningful figure in itself, but we can do the same for the forecasts and for the participation rates of 2001. This gives us some idea of the overall level of increase.
The average of the 1971 rates was 22.2% and the average of our forecasts 25.3%. The average of the 2001 activity rates was 25.8%. Our forecast was for an overall increase in participation of 1.14. The actual figure was 1.16.
We can repeat this exercise for groups of activities. The We chose participant sports as a fast growing group of activities, and we were right about that; in fact the actual increase was substantially greater than we forecast. For the other groups, our forecasts were surprisingly accurate.
Turning to individual activities, the picture is more confused. We seem to have done better with those activities that had higher rates of participation. Presumably this is partly an artefact of the measure we are using, namely the change in the percentage engaging in the activity. There is, obviously, more scope for growth for a minority activity; a figure of, say, four percent, might go up by a factor of two, three, four or more, whereas a figure of, say, 67% clearly cannot increase by a factor of more than 1.5. We did quite well with these but were wide of the mark with driving, listening to music and eating out. Driving is interesting. Like car maintenance and car cleaning, which are included in the next table, driving for pleasure was, not surprisingly, strongly related to car ownership and, since car ownership was set to increase, we forecast an increase in all three of these car-related activities. However, though car maintenance and car cleaning have indeed increased, in fact by more than we forecast, driving for pleasure has actually gone down. In 1971 more people were 'taking a drive for pleasure' than actually owned cars -others were clearly taking them out. Today this appears less prevalent. In a mature car-based society, the sheer novelty of going for a drive may have worn off while the amount of traffic on the road today may also have reduced the simple pleasure of doing so.
Listening to music has increased by a good deal more than we thought. An important variable here, which we made no attempt to take into account, is technology. There are now more ways of listening, such as the Walkman and more recently minidisc and mp3 players, than there were in 1971. There are also more places to eat -notably Americanstyle burger bars, pizza parlours and the like -which must partly explain the figures for eating out.
The figures for gardening look strange. It is hard to believe that gardening has not increased when garden centres have been springing up like mushrooms and when gardening programmes on TV seem to be rivalled only by cookery and interior design. Indeed, official statistics [10] suggest that participation has increased for both gardening and DIY, by roughly the amount we forecast. There is some suggestion that our original estimate may, because of regional differences, have overestimated actual participation in 1971 -in the 2001 survey, those in the South East had the highest gardening participation rate.
The second group of activities have participation rates between 15% and 50%: Knitting/sewing was one of the few activities for which we forecast a decrease, but not by nearly enough. That theatre-going, for which we forecast a rise, should have remained static or even declined seems surprising -higher-income, higher-status people go to the theatre more often, so theatre attendance ought to have gone up -but these figures are confirmed by official statistics which show that, at least for the second half of our forecast period (1987 -1998 , to be precise), the only cultural activity that increased was cinema-going [11] . Perhaps our over-estimate of the growth of social class I skewed this forecast particularly strongly.
Swimming, easily the most popular of the active sports and therefore the first to appear in these lists, has risen by more than we said. It is possible that much of this swimming takes place on holiday and, though we correctly forecast an increase in holidays, and particularly in foreign holidays, elsewhere in the report, we did not explicitly take this into account in the swimming forecast.
Our forecasts for the final, and largest, group -the minority activities -are a mixed bag: The effect of television can presumably be seen in the contrasting fortunes of snooker on the one hand and wrestling (spectator) on the other, the first enjoying hours of air time on a regular basis, the second losing the coverage it used to have. Football also, of course, receives large amounts of television coverage and the figures for football playing seem to reflect this. The figures for watching football (in the previous table) do not show quite such a large rise. The last thirty years have seen the introduction of all-seater stadia that have reduced attendance capacity. This, together with the massive promotion of the sport and increased costs (mainly through player wages), has also raised entrance prices. In fact, given these developments, it is perhaps surprising that football spectating has grown faster then we forecast. But then this is an example of a sport that, at least at the top end of the league, has managed to make itself more middle-class.
With camping and caravanning, as with swimming, it may be that we would have done better if we had specifically taken account of holidays. It seems likely, for example, that some of the growth in caravanning is in fact an increase in the number of people taking a second holiday at a caravan park. Similarly, the success of Eurocamp and the like in providing summer holidays in France and the rest of Europe must have boosted the camping figures. (Whether purists would consider these as real camping or caravanning is another matter.)
Ten-pin bowling was perhaps our worst forecast. Many bowling alleys were built in the 1960s but the initial enthusiasm wore off and, by 1971, the Rank Organisation had closed many of them and the sport was in the doldrums. They, or other providers, must have decided that they had over-reacted and restored some of the provision. Our survey snapshot of this activity caught it at a bad time.
Four of the spectator sports make an interesting group. The people who watched rugby, golf, tennis and horseracing were very much the same -higher income, car-owning, professional and managerial classes -so our forecasts were for a modest increase in all four. In fact the first two have risen sharply, the other two have declined. The result for rugby is in part an artefact of our regional problem mentioned earlier. Watching rugby is much more popular in the north than the south (league versus union), as is confirmed by the 2001 survey, so our original estimates for the country as a whole (based as they were on a survey in the South East) were almost certainly lower than they should have been.
Hence our lower forecast and hence the discrepancy with today's national figure. Even so, attendance at club and international matches in rugby union shows that some of the increase is genuine [12] . These four sports highlight an important aspect not included in our forecasting method: marketing. Rugby and golf have both been marketed aggressively and, it seems, effectively. Tennis less so and horseracing hardly at all [13] .
Some of the figures seem strange. The proportion of adults watching swimming seems extraordinarily high. Are they parents watching their children in swimming galas? The figures from our 2001 survey suggest this is the case with parents three times as likely to be swimming spectators as other people. And it is surprising that sailing, an activity closely related to income, should have remained static or even gone down at a time of rising incomes. We noted that supply constraints could affect the growth of sailing and other water sports but it seems unlikely that a ceiling had already been reached in 1971. The answer for the discrepancy here is again likely to be our original national estimates based on a regional survey. Sailing is much more popular in the south than it is in other parts of the country (4.1% for the South East and 5.0% for the South West and Wales compared to 1.3% in other parts of the U.K. according to our 2001 survey). In contrast to watching rugby where we under-estimated participation, in this case we probably over-estimated it and thus produced a higher forecast for the country as a whole than was appropriate.
There are some absentees from these tables that need a word of comment. Television viewing, a huge leisure-time activity, is not in the tables at all. This is because our standard measure -people who had taken part in the activity at least once in the last twelve months -is useless for television since the figure would be close to 100%. We did produce a forecast for television viewing in the report, but using time-diary data rather than the questionnaire results. The time-diarists were composed entirely of married people aged 30 to 49, so the viewing times did not apply to the whole population, but we forecast, for this group, a reduction in the weekly viewing from about 13 hours to about 11. Official figures for 1998 put the average weekly viewing for this group at about 23 hours and it has been suggested to us that this figure has not changed much since the 1960s [14] . It seems that our time-diary data for TV viewing was not comparable to the official figures for the population as a whole in 1971. But, it remains the case that, even with a different figure at that time, we would still have forecast a decline in the activity -something we return to below.
There were actually 69 activities listed in our 1971 report, of which 48 were chosen for the 2001 survey. The omitted ones include various small-minority sports such as waterskiing, fencing and horseriding, some indoor hobbies including handicrafts, cards, chess, crosswords and cooking, and also adult education and bingo. Winter sports, though appearing in the list of spectator sports, are absent from the participant sports; this was possibly an oversight in the original survey. Basketball was also absent from the original survey, perhaps being considered too obscure, though it would probably deserve inclusion today. Cycling was another strange absentee.
More interestingly, communicating via the computer, playing computer games, surfing the web -now all major leisure activities -are completely absent from the forecasts. Computers in 1971 were mainframes run by governments, universities or large organisations. They resembled collections of metallic wardrobes and were tended round the clock in air-conditioned rooms by trained operators. We suggested that people might communicate with them from terminals in their homes (another of our forecasts was that people would do more work from home, and there is some evidence that we were right). But computers that people would have on their desks, or in their homes, or carry around with them, were in the realms of science fiction. It is, of course, another shortcoming of our forecasting method that it cannot forecast an activity that does not already exist.
The other big absentee was what is now labelled "keep fit" which would include jogging (which might be one of the reasons why the athletics figure is significantly higher than we forecast), going to the gym, yoga and the like -all of which are reasonably commonplace nowadays. (For example, according to Future Foundation research the proportion of the population practising yoga has increased from 1% in 1986 to 6% today. [15] ) This is another area where cultural change -in this instance increasing health awareness and in its extremes an obsession with the body -has had a major impact on the nature of leisure.
What, then, can we conclude from a review of our forecasting exercise of thirty years ago? First, we are pleased, if somewhat surprised, that the forecasts were not too bad. We were right in many areas and wrong in some -spectacularly so in a few instances. But overall, we got the general drift right.
This review has highlighted some important points about forecasting as a science and the nature of social and economic change. To summarise these:
1. Any forecast is only as good as the assumptions that go into the model -a point generally recognised within the forecasting community. If your views about demographic or economic developments in the future turn out to be incorrect then, of course, your forecasts will suffer. This suggests that the development of scenarios that allow for a variety of different assumptions can be a useful tool. 2. Governments and other, external global forces (that promote competition, for example) continue to be important in influencing the development of marketsin this instance leisure activity. The policy changes (or global pressures, it matters not which for the purposes of this argument) that changed the trend in income distribution from the mid 1970s onwards had a direct impact on our forecasts. 3. Cultural factors are clearly important in forecasting leisure activities. We include in this the regional variations we have highlighted but we also note those activities that become fashionable or passé. An example of the latter is knitting (although there is clearly an economic element to this too -clothes prices have fallen so much in real terms that there is little to be gained economically from producing your own clothes); one of the former would be keep fit. It is difficult to know how one can forecast the development of a whole new category of leisure like going to the gym. 4. Market initiatives by suppliers (or governing bodies) can clearly have a major impact on the development of a sector. Our forecasts were wrong for ten-pin bowling because of supply-side developments. Conversely, horse racing (with some notable exceptions like Ascot and Cheltenham -see footnote) has failed to adapt sufficiently to appeal to developing consumer demands and expectations, and has failed to market itself properly. 5. Finally, new technology. It can be an extremely difficult aspect to forecast although a few people (for example, Arthur C Clarke) have been reasonably successful in predicting technological advance. And people like Clarke are good at the general rather than the specific. Were many people in 1941 -30 years before we were first analysing the leisure data -predicting the role and importance of television in people's lives and use of time in 1971, let alone 2001? And, as we pointed out, it was hard to even comprehend in the early seventies the potential impact of the digital revolution on people's leisure and wider lives.
But, all in all, we are left with two main conclusions. First, that the oft-predicted movement towards a more leisure-focused society continues at a steady pace [16] . In some instances, this results in a form of self-imposed pressure as we try to do more and more leisure activities in a not sufficiently expanding volume of leisure time (a direct comparison of the two surveys shows that the total number of any given activities that an individual will do in a year has increased by 20% over the 30 years -and remember this does not include 'new' categories like keep fit). But overall, this is surely a positive development and even, as Jonathan Gershuny has argued, one that is good for the economic development of the country [17] .
The second point that is particularly pleasing for forecasters is that the simple assumption that what certain groups in society do now is a good predictor of future trends has held up reasonably well; on the whole what the rich and famous do today, the mass of people will do tomorrow.
